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Abstract 
Behavioural finance models suggest that under uncertainty, investors overweight their private 
information and overreact to public signals. We test this theoretical prediction in an M&A 
framework. We find that under high information uncertainty, when investors are more likely 
to possess firm-specific information, acquiring firms generate highly positive and significant 
gains following the announcement of private stock and private cash acquisitions (positive 
news) while the market heavily punishes public stock (negative news) deals. On the other 
hand, under conditions of low information uncertainty, when investors do not possess private 
information, the market reaction is complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns) irrespective of the 
type of acquisition. Overall, we provide empirical evidence that shows that information 
uncertainty plays a significant role in explaining short-run acquirer abnormal returns. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper introduces a behavioural framework for merger and acquisitions (M&As) and 
investigate announcement acquirer returns in an environment of information uncertainty and 
private information1. This empirical research study is motivated by the theoretical 
behavioural finance models of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001). More specifically, theory pertains 
that if an investor trades on private signals and at a later stage a public signal confirms his/her 
initial private information, then his/her confidence rises. Hence, the literature conjectures that 
even if an individual initially does not suffer from any bias, a supporting public signal of their 
private information will contribute to higher levels of overconfidence leading to an 
overreaction, consistent with psychological evidence of confirmation bias impacting decision 
making (Klayman and Ha, 1987; Jonas et al., 2001). Evidence shows that this initial 
overreaction is corrected and reversed in the long run as further public signals drive prices 
back towards their fundamental level. Hirshleifer (2001) and Zhang (2006) show that the 
psychological bias of overconfidence2 increases under conditions of information uncertainty 
when the firm’s value is difficult to estimate. Furthermore, Zhang (2006) empirically shows 
that under conditions of uncertainty, good (bad) news generates relatively higher (lower) 
abnormal returns while when uncertainty is low, there is less market predictability. It is 
intuitive to believe that there should therefore be an impact of investor uncertainty on 
acquirer returns. 
We employ the above theoretical and empirical predictions in an M&A framework 
contributing with an alternative perspective of how information uncertainty can affect 
acquirer abnormal returns. It is agreed that acquisition announcements convey information to 
                                                          
1 By private information, we refer to information collected by individual investors based on personal research. 
We employ synchronicity as a proxy for private information. An extensive discussion is provided in Section 3.3. 
By information uncertainty, we adopt the terminology of Zhang (2006) and refer to ambiguity of new 
information regarding the firm value. This ambiguity emanates from the volatility of firm’s underlying 
fundamentals. 
2 Investor sentiment is used as an alternative term of investor overconfidence. 
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the public market, principally signalling positive or negative news regarding the intrinsic 
value of the acquiring firm. In particular, there is substantial evidence (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Draper and Paudyal, 2006) that suggests that the target 
firm’s listing status and the payment method used signal different information concerning the 
valuation conditions of the acquiring firm. For instance, Travlos (1987) suggests that 
investors will perceive the announcement of a stock offer for a public target as bad news 
since the market infers that the acquiring firm is likely to be overvalued leading to a lower re-
evaluation. On the other hand, Chang (1998) suggests that when we control for the listing 
status of the target, then positive information can be relayed to the market if a private target is 
to be acquired using stock given typical ownership characteristics of such firms that indicate 
the potential creation of a blockholder in the combined firm (something that is argued to 
provide an incentive for the private target to ensure the stock is not overvalued). Hence 
private stock acquisitions would lead to a greater re-evaluation of the acquirers’ share price. 
While this has been unanimously agreed upon, little has been studied over the influence of 
information uncertainty upon investor reactions to M&A announcements. Financial markets 
are rife with uncertainty. Rumours over potential merger activity filter into markets on a daily 
basis, and with Shiller (2003) arguing that animal spirits are playing a growing role in 
security returns, the investor impact of uncertainty is clearly becoming of increasing 
importance to understand. 
In the context of M&A, we propose that acquirer returns are likely to be exaggerated at 
times when the firm is subject to information uncertainty. Following previous theory, 
investors trading under uncertainty are expected to overreact and generate highly positive 
(negative) abnormal returns following the announcement of private stock (public stock) 
acquisitions which convey positive (negative) signal to the market. On the other hand, in the 
absence of information uncertainty, it is expected no market reaction. 
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We study the UK market as it is one of the largest capital market and one of the most 
active M&As countries. Faccio and Masulis (2005) document that UK acquirers account for 
65.3% of all European deals, while the UK is the second most-active takeover market in the 
world aside from the US. Together, these reflect our motivations to study the UK market. 
Methodologically, we capture information uncertainty using four well-known proxies, 
including: age, size, number of analyst and trading volume. To test whether investors are 
more likely to possess private information or not, we also employ stock price synchronicity 
as introduced by Roll (1988) and further developed by both Morck et al. (2000) and Chen et 
al. (2007). Roll (1988) suggests that a low R2 value should be observed in periods of no 
public news about the firm, indicating that the price movement is triggered by private 
information. Chen et al. (2007) among others3 adopt synchronicity as a measure of stock 
price informativeness and show that there is a strong positive relationship between the 
amount of private information within stock prices and the sensitivity of corporate investment 
to stock prices. Roll (1988) claims that the measure of stock price nonsynchroncity is not 
correlated with public information and thereby serves as a good approach to capture private 
information. In Roll’s own words, ‘‘the financial press misses a great deal of relevant 
information generated privately’’ (Roll, 1988: 564). 
The results suggest that under conditions of high information uncertainty and when 
investors are more likely to possess private information, announcements of takeovers which 
signal positive news for the acquiring firm’s intrinsic value (i.e. private stock deals) generate 
highly positive abnormal returns while takeovers which convey negative news (i.e. public 
stock) suffer high losses. On the other hand, when uncertainty is lower and investors are 
likely to possess private information (high synchronicity), zero economical and statistical 
abnormal returns are obtained irrespective of the type of the deal. Specifically, while previous 
                                                          
3 Morck et al. (2000), Durnev et al. (2003), Durnev et al. (2004), Jin and Myers (2006), Fernades and Ferreira (2008), 
Ferreira et al. (2008)) have used stock price nonsynchronicity to examine price informativeness. 
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literature (Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002) reports positive (around about 
+2%) abnormal returns for private stock deals and negative (around about -2%) abnormal 
returns for public stock deals, we shows that this picture is magnified under conditions of 
uncertainty and is overblown when we control for private information as well. On the other 
hand there is no market reaction (zero abnormal returns) when investor sentiment triggered 
by uncertainty is low. In other words, uncertainty seems to act as magnifying glass which 
‘magnifies’ the initial picture of the overall sample and prior evidence. These finding are 
consistent across all four proxies used to capture uncertainty. Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs) 48 months post the announcement of the takeover indicate a reversal in the long-
run, further supporting that the initial announcement performance was driven by overreaction 
and investor sentiment. 
This paper contributes to the corporate and behavioural finance literature in several ways. 
First, this is the first paper to our knowledge that applies information uncertainty and private 
information (as measured using synchronicity) in an empirical M&A framework, thereby 
offering a behavioural approach in explaining short-run acquirer gains. Previous studies 
assume that the market is semi-strong efficient and short-run acquirer gains captures either 
potential synergy or revaluation gains. We offer evidence that the findings of Travlos (1987) 
and Chang (1998) may be driven by high investor sentiment. Second, this paper contributes 
to the behavioural finance literature by empirically examining the propositions of Daniel et 
al. (1998). Third, it shows that in the absence of the signalling effect public stock acquisitions 
are not value destructive investment decisions. Finally, it offers further evidence that the 
market reacts asymmetrically following the announcement of positive and negative signals. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents research design 
and develops the research question; Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 
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analyses the empirical findings before Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of the 
investigation. 
 
2. Research Design and Testable Hypotheses 
2.1 Acquisitions Re-evaluation Effect 
The method of payment used to finance the transaction; along with the public/listing 
status of the target firm are of the major deal characteristics that can help to explain 
acquirers’ announcement performance. Derived from the seminal work of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), the signalling literature suggests that managers who believe that their firm’s stock 
price is undervalued will prefer to finance a potential acquisition with cash while when they 
consider that their stock price is overvalued, they will prefer to conduct equity transactions to 
capitalize upon this overvaluation4. Travlos (1987) suggests that investors will perceive the 
announcement of an equity offer for a public target as bad news leading to lower re-
evaluation of the acquirers’ share price. Takeovers are major corporate events that convey 
information regarding the prospects and managerial views of the firm value to the market. In 
this way, the private information of the manager enters the public spectrum of the market at 
the time of a acquisition announcement, predominantly via the manager’s financing choice. 
Conversely, Chang (1998), and Draper and Paudyal (2006) report a positive market 
reaction to the acquisition of private targets to be financed using equity. In these 
circumstances whereby the target firm is privately held, investors interpret such 
announcements as good news and this for several reasons. Primarily, unlisted firms tend to be 
owned by a small number of owners and hence these individuals are portrayed as having a 
stronger incentive to carefully examine the true value of the acquirers stock. If they believe it 
to be overvalued, then it would be an irrational act for these owners to accept the acquirer’s 
                                                          
4 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) provide a model in which acquisitions are driven by firm-misvaluation. They 
support the idea that overvaluation provides an incentive to acquire a less overvalued target using equity.   
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equity as payment for their firm. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the owner of the 
privately held firm will accept stock if they believe it to be overvalued as they will effectively 
‘lose-out’. Considering this, private stock acquisitions can be classified as positive 
announcements given the acceptance of the acquirer’s stock by the unlisted target, relaying a 
signal to the market that the acquirer’s stock price must not be overvalued leading to a greater 
re-evaluation of the acquirer’s share price. A cash acquisition for a private firm is usually 
considered a positive announcement as well but in truth, such an event does not reveal a lot of 
information regarding the acquirer’s intrinsic value in this setting. A reasonable assertion to 
make is that an acquirer paying for an unlisted target with cash may be less uncertain 
regarding the level of potential synergy gains that can be extracted from the proposed 
combination and as such is confident enough to offer cash. This loosely infers that the 
acquirer is confident, as they may be motivated to avoid the issuance of equity so as to avoid 
sharing potential synergy gains with the ownership of the target firm5. Therefore, a cash 
acquisition does not directly reveal information about the acquirer’s stock value but can, in 
general, be classified as a relatively positive piece of information. 
 
 
2.2 Behavioural Finance Models 
Honing in on behavioural finance, there is a plethora of literature that continues to grow 
in both popularity and size. Of late, research interests have typically centred on the resultant 
effects of information uncertainty. This paper takes note of this rising school of thought and 
offers a behavioural perspective to help explain short-term acquirer abnormal returns, a topic 
which has attracted much debate (Chang, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Bouwman et al., 
                                                          
5 The issue of equity to an unlisted target’s owners would result in the creation of blockholders in the combined 
entity.  
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2009). Experimental evidence shows that investors tend to overestimate the precision of their 
information, especially in cases where they have been personally involved in the collection of 
this information (Odean, 1999)6. Daniel et al. (1998) support this prediction and suggest that 
investors are overconfident about the private information they hold. When this private 
information is confirmed by a public signal, then these investors become more confident and 
are modelled to subsequently overreact to public information stimulus. 
Additionally, Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) also claim that investors become even more 
overconfident under conditions of information uncertainty. A large part of the psychology 
literature7 suggests that individuals overvalue their own abilities in the decision making 
process whilst also overestimating the precision of the outcome of the decision made8. 
Investors undoubtedly extract information from various sources (for example, from financial 
statements, the press and rumours amongst others). However, if they overestimate their own 
ability to extract this information, or they overweight the precision and significance of this 
information, then the resultant effect will be an overreaction due to the underestimation of the 
forecast error involved in the decision-making process. Daniel et al. (1998) define 
overconfident investors as those who overestimate the precision of their private information 
as opposed to the public signals available. They find that overconfident investors who possess 
private information will overweight this information, leading to a stock price overreaction. 
When an investor trades on his/her private information/signals and subsequently receives a 
public signal that serves to confirm the trading strategy being executed, then the investor’s 
confidence will rise. One of the advantages of the model of Daniel et al. (1998) when 
                                                          
6 Odean (1999) claims that there is excessive trading in equity markets. He explains this as a result of investors 
who are overconfident. Markets, in turn, become affected by this psychological bias as investors inevitably trade 
a lot because they repeatedly feel the gains they earn are not enough. Interestingly, securities purchased by 
overconfident investors are found to underperform those they sell supporting that overconfidence destroys value 
and leads to excessive trading volumes.   
7 See, for example, Griffin and Tversky (1992), Greenwald (1980), Svenson (1981), Cooper et al. 1988, Taylor 
and Brown (1988). 
8 Hirshleifer (2001) suggests that psychological biases grow both under conditions of greater uncertainty, in the 
absence of accurate feedback about fundamentals.  
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compared to previous behavioural models9 is that it assumes that investors become 
overconfident about private signals and therefore allows for both over- and under-reaction 
effects. Furthermore, the authors claim that since the model is mainly based on both private 
information and subsequent under or overreaction, its predictive power will be more evident 
for firms with higher information uncertainty. 
Zhang (2006) also suggests that investor overreaction should be more prominent under 
conditions of information uncertainty since investors become more overconfident for firms 
that are hard to value. He finds that under conditions of information uncertainty, 
announcements of good news generate relatively higher abnormal returns while 
announcements of bad news generate relatively lower abnormal returns. While Zhang (2006) 
controls only for information uncertainties, he does not include private information into his 
analysis, proposing that further investigation is required. 
 
2.3 Our Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
In this paper, we test the theoretical predictions of the behavioural models within a M&A 
framework. More specifically, we empirically investigate the acquirer announcement market 
reaction for the various types of takeovers under conditions of information uncertainty and 
private information. To capture information uncertainty, we employ four different proxies 
used in the literature such as age, size, analysts and trading volume. Young, small, low 
trading volume and/or acquiring firms followed by a small number of analysts are more likely 
to be subject to information uncertainty. For private information, we employ an established 
measure, namely synchronicity, introduced by Roll (1988). The lower the co-variation of the 
acquiring firm’s share price with the market and/or industry index, the more likely it is that 
                                                          
9 Kyle and Wang (1997), Odean (1999) and Wang (1998) define overconfidence as overestimation of 
information precision regardless of whether the information is private or public. 
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the acquiring firm’s share price will be moving due to firm-specific rather than market-wide 
information. 
Following this discussion above, we form the following predictions: 
Prediction 1: For acquires subject to high information uncertainty i.e. young, small, low 
trading volume and/or acquirers followed by a small number of analysts and for which 
investors are more likely to possess private information i.e. low synchronicity, the market is 
expected to overreact positively following the announcement of acquisitions of private targets 
paid for with equity or cash. 
Prediction 2: For acquires subject to high information uncertainty i.e. young, small, low 
trading volume and/or acquirers followed by a small number of analysts and for which 
investors are more likely to possess private information i.e. low synchronicity, the market is 
expected to overreact negatively following the announcement of acquisitions of public targets 
paid for with equity. 
Under high information uncertainty conditions (i.e. young, small, low trading volume 
and/or acquirers followed by a small number of analysts) and when investors are more likely 
to possess private information (i.e. low synchronicity stocks), investors are more likely to 
overreact upon the announcement of a takeover deal. Investors will overreact and generate 
highly positive abnormal returns following the announcement of acquisitions which signal 
‘good’ news – i.e. private targets financed with cash or stock, and public targets financed 
with cash. Under the same conditions, the market reaction will be highly negative following 
announcements of takeovers which signal ‘bad’ news – i.e. public targets paid for with stock. 
Prediction 3: For acquires subject to low information uncertainty i.e. old, large, high trading 
volume and/or acquirers followed by a large number of analysts and for which investors are 
less likely to possess private information i.e. high synchronicity, the market reaction is 
expected to be complete (zero abnormal returns) following the announcement of any 
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acquisition, irrespective of the target’s public status (private or public) or the method of 
payment (cash or stock). 
When information uncertainty conditions are expected to be low (i.e. old, large, high 
trading volume and/or acquirers followed by a large number of analysts) coupled with 
investors who are less likely to have collected private information (i.e. high synchronicity), 
then the market reaction is expected to be complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns). 
 
3. Sample Selection, Data and Methodology 
3.1 The Sample 
The sample consists of takeover announcement deals undertaken by UK acquiring firms 
for the period between 01/01/1985 and 31/12/2008. The announcement dates for each deal 
were sourced from Thomson Security Data Corporations (SDC). For inclusion into the final 
sample, the following deal criteria was set:  
o The acquirer is a U.K. firm publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) with 
five days of return data available around the announcement date of the takeover as well 
as available data for three years Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) from the 
DataStream database. 
o The target company is either a listed or private company and can be a domestic or a 
foreign company. 
o The acquisition was financed wither by 100% equity or 100% cash 
o The acquiring firm purchases at least 50% of the target’s shares. 
o The deal value is ₤1 million or more. 
o The deal value represents at least 1% of the market value of the acquirer. 
o Multiple deals announced within a 5 day period are excluded. 
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The initial sample from Thompson One Banker was 20,306 deals and after the 
exclusion of deals according to the above criteria, our final sample totaled 1,839 deals. Of 
these deals, 1,409 were for takeovers of private targets and 430 were for public firms. Our 
study focuses especially on Private Stock and Public Stock which signal the strongest 
positive and negative signals respectively. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the final sample. The median age of 
acquirers is around 12.97 years and the median size of acquirers is around 170.17 million 
pounds. Half of the acquirers are followed by 4 or analysts of more and the median deal size 
of our sample is 12.75, inferring that around half of the deals conducted have are between £1 
and £12.75 million in size. In addition, the relative size of the target firm over that of the 
acquirer is 8.22% indicating that target firm are quite relative sizeable and would have a 
significant impact on acquirers. Panel B reports that there is an almost even divide between 
the numbers of diversified transactions to non-diversified ones and domestic acquisitions 
slightly exceed cross-border ones. Panel C reports the number and percentage of acquirers per 
industry. The Other & Unclassified describes data that for which no data is provided by 
DataStream or SDC as well as financials and utilities. Since this is a study with a behavioural 
approach, we had no particular reason to exclude those deals. This information is not directly 
influential over our analysis in regards to the key research objectives of this paper and thus 
they remain in the sample.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2 Measures of Information Uncertainty 
In order to capture information uncertainty, we employ four proxies recommended 
within the literature. The first measure employed is Age. The existing literature suggests that 
the younger the firm is, the higher the amount of uncertainty there will be regarding the 
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firm’s value (Zhang, 2006; Jiang et al., 2005; Barry and Brown, 1985). Young firms are 
associated with a lower amount of information dissemination and thus the age of the firm can 
be used as a proxy for the level of information uncertainty surrounding its value. We measure 
age as the difference between the date of incorporation of the firm and the date of the 
announcement of the acquisition. 
Size is the second proxy employed in order to capture information uncertainty 
regarding the acquirer’s value. Smaller firms are less likely to disclose a lot of information 
and are less diversified than larger firms. However, small firms also have a lower number of 
suppliers, investors and customers and therefore the accessibility of information can be more 
difficult. Hence, small size firms are more likely to be associated with a higher degree of 
information uncertainty (Zhang, 2006). We measure size as the Market Value (MV) of the 
acquiring firm 20 days before the announcement of the acquisition. 
Analyst Coverage is the third proxy used to capture information uncertainty. The role 
of analysts is to collect, analyze and distribute information about the company’s performance. 
The lower the number of analysts following a firm, the smaller the amount of available 
information about the specific firm. Zhang (2006) and Hong et al. (2000) use this approach as 
a measure of information uncertainty. Analyst coverage is measured as the number of analyst 
following the acquiring firm the year prior to the announcement of the acquisition. Firm 
followed by less than two analysts are classified as subject to high information uncertainty 
while those followed by two or more are classified as low information uncertainty acquirers. 
Trading Volume is the fourth proxy used within this work to measure information 
uncertainty. Low trading volumes suggest that a lower number of investors are aware or are 
following the firm. Thus there is likely to be less trading activity associated with the acquirers 
who exhibit a low trading volume. The trading volume of the acquirer is measured as the 
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firm’s average daily trading volume scaled by the total number of shares outstanding six 
months prior to the announcement of the acquisition (Jiang et al., 2005). 
Table 2 reports the degree of correlation across all four proxies as well as 
synchronicity. Some of these measures are indeed positively correlated such as analyst 
coverage with Age or Size. However, other pairs, such as volume with age and/or analysts 
exhibit very low correlations (Table 2). There is low correlation between synchronicity and 
age and volume proxies while it is higher for analysts and age. This is quite reasonable as the 
higher the number of analysts or the larger the firm, the higher the synchronicity. In other 
words, when more analysts follow a firm, they search and collect private information which 
they reveal and make it available to the public. Similarly, large firms are more exposed to the 
market. Hence, there is lower likelihood of investor to possess private info (higher 
synchronicity). 
In addition, Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation matrix among the control 
variables are used in the multivariate analysis and there seems to face no serious high 
correlations among the control variable. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.3 Measure of Private Information 
Recent models emanating from the school of behavioural finance have focused on the 
role of private information and its subsequent impact on investors’ cognitive biases alongside 
their following investment decisions. One of the roles of financial markets is to facilitate the 
production and accumulation of information into stock prices. This occurs through the impact 
of the trading activities of speculators on stock prices. Financial economists support the 
notion that stock returns incorporate firm-specific and market-wide information. Roll (1988) 
claims that stock prices move together depending on the amount of firm-specific or market-
wide information impounded in stock prices. He also explains that stock price movements are 
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influenced by market-wide economic shocks, by industry shocks and by news specific to the 
firm. 
Chen et al. (2007) suggest that managers learn from the private information 
incorporated in stock prices and take advantage of this information within their corporate 
investment decisions. More specifically, they suggest that private information is incorporated 
in stock prices through speculators trading activity. An important point to note is that a high 
level of private information does not imply that stock prices are close to fundamentals. The 
variation between a stock price and its fundamental value depends on the amount of public 
information available for that stock as well. The incorporation of private information is a 
timely procedure and that may imply that stock prices with more private than public 
information might be further away from fundamentals. Theoretical evidence (Dow and 
Gorton, 1997; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) suggests that managers can extract useful 
information hidden in stock prices. Stock prices accumulate a lot of information from various 
trading participants in the market who do not have any other way of communicating with the 
firm apart from via the trading process. Consequently, stock prices may incorporate 
information that managers do not have. Different stocks have different levels of private 
information incorporated within them due to the various costs involved in the acquisition and 
production of such information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Ferreira and Laux (2007) 
argue that firms with fewer antitakeover provisions for which investors have a higher benefit 
to search for private information are associated with higher levels of idiosyncratic risk, 
trading activity and private information flow. 
This paper follows Chen et al. (2007) to measure stock price synchronicity. The 
variation of stock returns can be decomposed into the following components: market-wide 
variation, industry-specific variation and firm-specific variation. This work needs to capture 
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the last component of firm-specific variation, which can be measured by the R2 of the 
following regression: 
i, j,t i,0  i,m m,t i, j j,t ,r  r    r i tE E E H      (1) 
where ri,j,t is the return of acquirer i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t 
and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. To construct this regression, weekly returns for a 
period of 24 weeks (6 months) before the announcement of the acquisition are used. 
 
3.4 Short-Run Event Study Methodology 
To calculate the acquiring firms’ performance and identify the short-run impact of 
information uncertainty and private information, we employ standard event study 
methodology (Fuller et al., 2002) to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for 
a five-day period (-2, +2)10 around the announcement date, as provided by DataStream. We 
estimate abnormal returns using the modified market model as follows: 
, , ,i t i t m tAR R R     (2) 
Where ARi,t is the excess return of acquirer i on day t;  Ri,t is the return of acquirer i 
on day t measured as the percentage change in return index including dividends of acquirer i; 
and Rm,t is the market return estimated as the percentage change in FTSE All Share Index 
(value-weighted) on day t. The CARs are calculated as the sum of the Abnormal Returns 
(ARi,t) for the five days surrounding the announcement of the acquisition as per the following 
equation: 
2
2
( )
t
i i m
t
CAR R R
 
 
 ¦
   (3)
 
3.5 Long-Run Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns 
                                                          
10 We have conducted our analysis using a 3-day window (-1,+1) and the results remain consistent. 
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If the initial short-run market reaction to takeover announcements was driven by 
investor overreaction, a price correction should be observed in the long-run. To examine the 
long-run abnormal stock returns, we employ 48-month buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997). The BHAR is computed as: 
  T mtT iti RRBHAR 11 )1()1(    (4) 
where Rit is the monthly return for company i and Rmt is the monthly return of the market 
index. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Acquirer Announcement Returns 
Table 3 reports the five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the full sample by 
the target’s listing status (i.e. private or public) and by the method of payment used to finance 
the deal (cash or stock). Acquirers which bid for private target firms enjoy positive and 
significant gains of 1.7% while for acquisitions of targets which are listed firms, acquirers 
suffer marginally insignificant losses of -0.40%. While the target listing status impacts the 
returns generated for acquiring firms, the signaling literature indicates that the method of 
payment used by the acquirer to finance the deal plays a significant role in determining the 
returns to be experienced. With respect to the method of payment used, acquisitions for 
private targets paid for with stock (3.80%) enjoy 2.60% (p-value: 0.017) significantly more 
abnormal returns than those paid for with cash (1.20%) (see Chang, 1998; Ang and Cohers, 
2001; Draper and Paudyal, 2006; and Fuller et al., 2002). On the other hand, takeovers for 
public target firms paid for with equity suffer significant losses (-2.50%) while those paid for 
with cash generate positive abnormal returns (1.10%). The difference of 3.60% is statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level (Travlos, 1987). We present these results for two 
reasons - firstly to show that the picture of the overall sample is consistent with the prior 
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evidence reported in the literature and secondly, to show how the initial picture of the overall 
sample changes under the presence or absence of information uncertainty and private 
information. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Tables 4 reports the short-term performance of takeovers for private and public targets 
paid for cash and stock respectively (denoted PrivateCash, PrivateStock, PublicCash and 
PublicStock respectively) under conditions of information uncertainty as captured by four 
proxies and private information as captured by synchronicity. Panel A depicts announcement 
abnormal returns by employing the Age proxy to capture information uncertainty. The 
younger a firm is, the higher the level of uncertainty there is regarding the firms true value. 
As outlined earlier, Chang (1998) indicates that PrivateStock acquisitions serve as a positive 
news to the market that acquiring firm’s share price is not overvalued due to the target’s 
acceptance of the acquirer’s equity. The overall short-term performance of the PrivateStock 
portfolio is 3.80% (p-value: 0.000). Under conditions of information uncertainty, 
PrivateStock deals generate 4.40% abnormal returns while when private information is also 
incorporated (HiuLs), PrivateStock deals generate even stronger positive abnormal returns of 
5.70% (0.005) for the acquirer. On the other hand, under low information uncertainty, the 
market reaction is lower (2.40%) and when the private information of investors is likely to be 
lower, the market reaction is almost zero (0.60% insignificant gains). The difference of 
2.10% between High and Low information portfolios amplifies to 5.00% (statistically 
significant: p-value: 0.037) when private information is taken into account. This indicates that 
the market reaction is fundamentally different between the two states of uncertainty and 
consistent with the theoretical behavioural finance models. Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) suggest 
that investors tend to overweight their private information and become even more 
overconfident under conditions of information uncertainty. When private information is 
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included, the overconfidence of the investor is likely to become even more intense so that the 
differences are expected to be amplified. This performance of Private stock deals under 
conditions of uncertainty seem to be almost 3 times more that the results reported in the 
literature (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). On the other hand, in the absence of uncertainty 
and private information, private stock deals obtain marginally positive but insignificant 
abnormal returns (0.60%). That shows that when investors possess a level of private 
information, there is a highly positive reaction following the announcement of events that 
signal positive news about the acquiring firm’s intrinsic value. On the other hand, when 
investors are less likely to possess private information and thus have less potential to 
overestimate its precision, there is no significant market reaction. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The picture for private acquisitions paid with cash (PrivateCash) is similar to the one 
described above. PrivateCash deals also convey positive news to the market but less strong 
than that of PrivateStock deals. The difference between conditions of high versus low 
uncertainty is positive and significant but to a lower magnitude (1.60%). PublicCash deals 
seem not to convey neither positive nor a negative signal to the market. For that reason, we 
observe no economical or statistically significant difference between the two states of the 
market for PublicCash deals. The discussion will mainly focus on PrivateStock and 
PublicStock deals which convey strongly positive and negative signals respectively. 
The picture described above is different for acquisitions for public target firms paid 
for with equity (PublicStock). PublicStock acquisitions signal negative news to the market 
regarding the intrinsic value of the acquiring firm’s value. In the overall sample, PublicStock 
deals generate significantly negative losses of -2.50% (p-value: 0.000) for the acquiring firm. 
When we control for uncertainty, the negative performance becomes even more negative (-
3.30%) under conditions of high information uncertainty. When private information is also 
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incorporated, the performance of PublicStock deals amplifies even more (-3.70%). On the 
other hand, it declines to -1.20% under low uncertainty and even lower to -1.00% (0.423) 
under lower information uncertainty and no private information. The difference between the 
two states of the market is 2.70% and statistically significant (p-value: 0.098). This evidence 
is also consistent with the theoretical behavioural finance models of Daniel et al. (1998, 
2001). The market over-reaction lead PublicStock deals to even more negative short-run 
abnormal performance.  
The findings described above can be visualized in Figure 1. The first column of each 
group shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the overall sub-portfolios, which is 
consistent with existing empirical literature. The second column depicts the market reaction 
to takeover announcements when information uncertainty is high while the third column 
represents the cumulative abnormal returns for the portfolio in the absence of uncertainty and 
private information. It is clear that under conditions of uncertainty, there is a market 
overreaction. There is a highly positive reaction for positive-signaling deals (i.e. PrivateStock 
and PrivateCash) and a highly negative one for those takeovers signaling negative news (i.e. 
PublicStock). On the other hand, in the absence of uncertainty and private information, the 
market reaction is complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns), as displayed in the third column for 
each of the four sub-portfolios. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
For robustness, we conduct this analysis using a further three proxies, namely size, 
analysts and trading volume in order to capture information uncertainty. The results are 
provided in Panels B, C, and D respectively. The overall picture for the four types of 
acquisitions (i.e. PrivateStock, PrivateCash, PublicStock and PublicCash) remains highly 
similar to the evidence indicated by the age proxy and the findings remain consistent across 
all four proxies. 
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The results for the overall portfolios are consistent with the evidence reported in the 
prior literature (Travlos, 1987; and Chang, 1998). When we allow for investor sentiment to 
enter the picture, we observe a positive (negative) overreaction following the announcement 
of positive (negative) signaling takeovers. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
work of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) and Hirshleifer (2001). Zhang (2006) also reports similar 
evidence. He empirically shows that under conditions of uncertainty, good (bad) news 
generates relatively higher (lower) abnormal returns while when uncertainty is low, there is 
less market predictability. At this point, we need to make it clear that this paper does not 
argue that the whole acquirers’ announcement reaction is driven by behavioural biases. 
Synergies, timing and other factors may be determining factors in relation to the short-run 
quality of a takeover deal. This study investigates how the re-evaluation of the acquiring firm 
(positive or negative) is conveyed to the market through the announcement of an acquisitions 
can be interpreted under conditions of high and low investor sentiment. 
Another important point to note is related to potential risk-based explanations for the 
results. One might argue that the proxies used to capture information uncertainty could also 
be used as risks factors. However, we feel our results fall more in line with the behavioural 
story presented in this paper rather with a neoclassical approach. Primarily, neoclassical 
explanations suggest that high risk acquirers should be associated with high returns. This is 
the case of PrivateStock, PrivateCash and PublicCash (positive signalling) acquisitions but 
exactly the opposite is observed for PublicStock (negative signalling) deals. For public stock 
deals, the higher the risk (uncertainty), the more negative the returns are. Therefore this 
finding gives additional support to the behavioural (uncertainty) story, rather with to the 
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rational (risk) story. In addition, we control for the potential effects of risk by employing the 
Fama-French 3 factor model11. 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
The existing M&A literature has documented a number of different factors that can 
affect the performance of acquiring firms, such as book-to-market (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998), relative size (Fuller et al., 2002. Croci et al., 2010), total assets, leverage, cash-to-
assets (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) and industry diversification (Doukas and Kan, 2004). 
To examine whether differences in acquirer and deal characteristics explain the 
abnormal return differentials, we adopt a multivariate regression framework whereby 
announcement period returns for acquirers are regressed against a set of explanatory variables 
that have been proven in the literature to affect acquirers’ performance. Moreover, the 
multivariate framework enables us to overcome issues related to the small number of 
observations in some portfolios12.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In all regressions we include the following control variables: the acquirer’s book-to-
market value, which is measured by the acquirer’s net book value of assets divided by its 
market value one month before the announcement of the deal; the deal’s relative size, which 
is measured as the ratio of the deal value over the acquirer’s value; the logarithmic form of 
acquirer’s total assets as measured the year prior to the acquisition announcement; Leverage 
is measured as acquirer’s long term debt divided by the market value of equity the year prior 
to the acquisition announcement; Cash-to-Assets is measures as acquirer’s cash prior to the 
year of the announcement scaled by its total assets; a dummy variable for diversifying deals 
                                                          
11 The results of these examinations are not reported in this work but are available upon request, and simply 
serve to reinforce the results reported in Table 4. 
12 There are a relatively low number of acquisitions for public targets paid for with equity in the UK. 
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which takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the 
target, and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target is a 
domestic firm. 
For brevity, we present the multivariate analysis only for PrivateStock and 
PublicStock deals which signal the most positive and negative news respectively. The results 
for PrivateCash and PublicCash deals follow similar patterns to the evidence discussed here 
for PrivateStock acquisitions. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for the Age proxy. In 
regressions (1), we include a dummy variable (High) that takes the value of 1 if the deal is 
classified as high uncertainty, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a deal involves 
the acquisition of a private target and financed by equity and zero otherwise (PrivateStock) as 
well an interactive variable of PrivateStock times High which would capture the impact of 
information uncertainty on private stock deals. In all regressions, our focus is on the 
interactive variable. The interactive variable in regression (1) is positive and significant 
(0.024). In regressions (2), we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal 
belongs in the high uncertainty and low synchronicity group (HiuLs) as well an interactive 
variable of PrivateStock times HiuLs which would capture the impact of states of information 
uncertainty and private information for private stock deals. When along with information 
uncertainty, we incorporate private information in regression (2), the interactive variable 
becomes even more positive (0.036) and more significant providing further support to the 
findings presented in the previous section. This finding remains robust when we proxy 
information uncertainty with other three proxies (see regressions (5), (6), (9), (10) and (13), 
(14) in Panels B, C and D respectively). Under uncertainty, investors overweight their private 
information and we observe a significant positive relationship between CARs and high levels 
of private information. A negative overreaction is observed in regressions (3), (7), (11) and 
(15) for PublicStock deals under high information uncertainty. The interactive dummy 
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variable (PublicStock*High) carries a negative and significant coefficient indicating that 
under conditions of information uncertainty, the market reacts even more negatively for 
public stock deals. In regressions (4), (8), (12) and (16), where we combine information 
uncertainty and private information, the interactive variable (PublicStock*HiuLs) becomes 
even more negative and significant. The results are robust among all four proxies for 
information uncertainty. The multivariate analysis offers supportive evidence to the 
conclusions drawn from the univariate analysis. In absolute term, the interactive variable for 
public stock acquisition is higher than that of private stock indicating an asymmetric response 
to positive and negative news. These finding is consistent with Epstein and Schneider (2008) 
and Bernard et al. (1997) find significant differences in the markets response with regards to 
receiving a signal of good and bad news. 
 
4.3 The impact of Disclosure on Stock Price Synchronicity 
Throughout this paper, we take the view of Roll (1988), among others, who claims that the 
measure of stock price nonsynchroncity is not correlated with public information and thereby 
serves as a good approach to capture private information. Synchronicity captures firm-
specific information. Given that for UK public firms (our sample of bidders), transparency 
and disclosure is more homogenous compared to other countries, we made the wider 
assumption, that variation in stock price synchronicity is more likely to capture and be driven 
by private information collected by investors. Jin and Myers (2006) and Gul, Kim and Qiu 
(2010) argue that synchronicity is higher in less developed economies with poorer corporate 
governance. In such markets, synchronicity is likely to capture, apart from private 
information, public firm-specific information as well. 
Despite our initial assumption, for robustness reasons, we acknowledge that the measure of 
synchronicity may capture public firm-specific information. To deal with this issue, we 
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construct a measure of disclosure to control for that issue. Vast financial accounting literature 
discusses disclosure and measures that could proxy for that. We follow a UK study by 
Mouselli et al. (2012) who argue that accrual quality is positively associated with disclosure 
since firms with higher disclosure quality are less likely to engage in earnings management 
and therefore have higher accruals quality. 
To calculate Abnormal Working Capital Accruals (AWCA), we follow Marra et al. (2011). 
AWCA is calculated for each bidding firm at the end of the year before the announcement 
date as follows: 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡 − [(
𝑊𝐶𝑡−1
𝑆𝑡−1
) 𝑆𝑡] 
Where t is the year end before the acquisition announcement, AWCA is the Abnormal 
Working Capital Accrual; WC is the non-cash working capital and is calculated as Current 
Assets minus cash and short term investments minus current liabilities plus short-term debt. S 
is Total Sales. AWCA is scaled by Total Assets13. 
To control for information emanating from the firm through various disclosure mechanisms, 
we regress the above disclosure measure on synchronicity and we keep the residual. The 
variation in synchronicity that cannot be explained by disclosure (public information) is more 
likely to represent private information. In this way, we cleaner a cleaner measure for private 
information. In this section and in Table 6, we use this cleaner measure of synchronicity to 
capture private information. The results are robust and hold. Table 6 presents evidence 
similar to Table 5. Actually, our results become even stronger. The interactive variable for 
private stock deals (PrivStock*HiuLs) becomes even more positive and significant while the 
interactive variable for public stock deals (PublicStock*HiuLs) becomes even more negative 
and significant as compared to the regression where we have not incorporated private 
                                                          
13 We have tried different variations of this measure, such as not scaling by total assets, or by taking the absolute 
value of AWCA as in Marra et al. (2011) and the results are robust 
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information (see table 5 in the paper, regressions 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15) as well as 
compared to the regressions where we use raw synchronicity as a proxy of private 
information (see table 5 in the paper, regressions 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16) 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.4 Long-Run Performance 
If this initial short-run market performance is driven by investor overreaction, as we 
argue so far, a long-run reversal should be observed in the long-run. Table 7 presents a 
multivariate analysis with exactly the same variables used in table 5 for Buy-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHARs) for 4 years (48 months) post the announcement of the takeover. Results 
show that the initial overreaction disappears and reverses in the long-run. The interactive 
coefficient for private stock deals becomes negative and significant for most proxies of 
information uncertainty. The same applies for public stock deals. The interactive coefficient 
for public stock deals becomes positive and significant in the long run indicating that the 
short-run negative overreaction is reversed. In unreported results, we test various post 
announcement event windows such as 3, 6 and 12 months as well as 2, 3 and 4 years. The 
results for the period up to 1 year show a price continuation (positive for private stock and 
negative for public stock deals) after the announcement date which disappears in year 2. 
There is weak evidence of reversal in year 3 and slightly stronger evidence of reversal in the 
reported results in Table 7. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Daniel et al. (1998) who argue that investors’ biases cause overreaction and momentum in 
stock prices which is finally reversed.  This picture reinforces our initial argument that a large 
part of the short-run announcement abnormal returns have been driven by investor 
overreaction. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the market response to the re-evaluation effect of takeover 
announcements. We adopt a behavioural approach within a UK sample set under conditions 
of information uncertainty and private information. More specifically, we examine the short-
term acquirer gains controlling for information uncertainty regarding the acquirer and the 
effects of the deal, as well as the level of the investor’s private information in the surrounding 
environment of the acquirer. 
The main findings suggest that under conditions of high information uncertainty and 
when investors are more likely to possess private information, announcements of takeovers 
which convey positive news concerning the acquiring firm’s intrinsic value (i.e. PrivateStock 
and PrivateCash deals) generate highly positive abnormal returns. Under the same conditions, 
takeovers which signal negative news (i.e. PublicStock) suffer high losses. On the other hand, 
when uncertainty is lower and investors are less likely to possess private information (i.e. 
high synchronicity), zero economical and statistical abnormal returns are obtained 
irrespective of the type of the deal undertaken. 
This evidence is consistent with the theoretical work of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) who 
suggest that investors are overconfident and overreact to public announcements under 
conditions of uncertainty. Furthermore, they claim that investors, due to a self-attribution 
bias, become even more overconfident about their own private information following the 
public announcement and overreact even more. Consequently, under uncertainty, investors 
with private information react highly positively following the announcement of good news 
(i.e. PrivateCash, PrivateStock) while they react very negatively following the announcement 
of bad news (i.e. PublicStock deals). When there is low uncertainty and investors do not 
possess private information, the market reaction is complete.  
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Overall, this paper offers a behavioural explanation for the market reaction following 
takeover announcement. Even after controlling for risk factors by employing the classical 
Fama-French 3 factor model, our results are robust and consistent with our behavioural 
explanations. The short-run market reaction to M&As announcements reflects either potential 
synergy and/or revaluation gains. Our evidence suggests that there is a market overreaction 
driven by investor biases. Investors’ biases increase especially with uncertainty and will also 
depend on the type of news conveyed by each type of takeover. Investors will react either 
highly positively or negatively with private information following a positive or negative news 
respectively. In the absence of uncertainty, the market reaction is complete. 
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